

**Rise of the Machines:  
The Impact of Automated Underwriting**  
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# Summary

- **Question:** can algorithmic underwriting outperform human underwriting?
  - ▶ And what are the **mechanisms** behind performance differences?
- **Approach:** experiment assigning auto loans to human vs. "machine" underwriters
- **Main Findings:**
  - ▶ Machine-underwritten loans are 10.2% **more profitable** and **default** 6.8% **less** often
  - ▶ When gains to **strategic** manipulation are highest  $\Rightarrow$  humans underperform **worse**
  - ▶ Humans perform worse as loans become more **"complex"**
- **Comments:** mechanisms, the experiment, external validity

# Mechanisms

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## Better Incentives *and* Better Info Processing?

- Underwriter incentives **not** perfectly aligned with profit maximization
  - ▶ Paid on average \$41 **per contract** and get quarterly compensation for portfolio perf.
  - ▶ Loans with LTV > 125% require higher APR ( $\Rightarrow$  less competitive bid)
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  - ▶ **Test:** more manipulation of the 125% LTV cutoff among high vs. low complexity loans?
  - ▶ **Test:** do humans outperform machines in terms of maximizing human compensation?

## Additional Explanation: Risk Aversion

- Risk averse humans may pick lower-return loans than risk-neutral machines
- However, higher default rate doesn't suggest humans being extra cautious
- **Test:** are returns on human-originated loans less variable? If so, risk aversion is not a compelling explanation here

|                          | Human (N=70,033) |         | Machine (N=70,990) |         | Difference | t-stat   |
|--------------------------|------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|------------|----------|
|                          | Mean             | S.D     | Mean               | S.D     |            |          |
| Credit Score             | 530.8            | 48.5    | 525.9              | 46.9    | -4.96***   | (-19.10) |
| Homeowner Indicator      | 0.046            | 0.21    | 0.037              | 0.19    | -0.0088*** | (-8.27)  |
| Bankruptcy               | 0.28             | 0.45    | 0.33               | 0.47    | 0.052***   | (21.15)  |
| Debt-to-Income Ratio     | 0.39             | 0.20    | 0.38               | 0.32    | -0.010***  | (-7.10)  |
| Vehicle Age (years)      | 2.68             | 1.85    | 2.75               | 1.90    | 0.067***   | (6.70)   |
| Vehicle Book Value       | 13859.0          | 3970.8  | 13601.5            | 3995.7  | -257.5***  | (-12.14) |
| Vehicle Mileage          | 40618.7          | 21799.4 | 41040.5            | 22573.7 | 421.8***   | (3.57)   |
| Vehicle Make Reliability | 53.0             | 17.2    | 53.3               | 17.4    | 0.31***    | (3.40)   |
| Vehicle Import Indicator | 0.66             | 0.47    | 0.68               | 0.46    | 0.021***   | (8.53)   |
| Vehicle Luxury Indicator | 0.037            | 0.19    | 0.033              | 0.18    | -0.0039*** | (-4.01)  |

# Randomization

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# Evidence of Randomization

- **Ideal** data would include characteristics of rejected loan applicants (not just accepted)
  - ▶ Would want to see **balance** on observables (consistent with randomization)
- Would build confidence in design to know more about **how** firm randomized
- Possible to look for balance in characteristics we don't think would influence underwriting decisions?
  - ▶ E.g., loan application dates (day of the week, month, etc.)

# External Validity

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## External Validity (Micro)

- Would algorithmic lending perform worse in more **soft-info** intensive settings?
  - ▶ E.g., small business loans?
- Would algorithmic lending perform worse in settings with more **strategic default**?
  - ▶ "You can sleep in your car, but you can't drive your house to work"
  - ▶ Higher APR might have a less negative effect on default in auto loan markets
  - ▶ How good are algorithms at separating **adverse selection & moral hazard**?  
(similar challenge to separating **correlation & causation**)

# External Validity (Macro)

- How would widespread adoption of algorithmic pricing impact lender **competition?**
  - ▶ Convergence in pricing?
  - ▶ Reduced labor costs  $\Rightarrow$  reduced barriers to entry?
- Algorithmic pricing can be both *prediction-enhancing* and *commitment-enhancing*
  - ▶ Without managerial override, can commit to irrational strategies *off the path*
  - ▶ Ease of override can affect degree of competition (Leisten, 2021)
- **Will enhanced competition erode profit gains in equilibrium?**

# Conclusion

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# Conclusion

- Great paper! Valuable look into by how much and *why* machines beat humans
- Sheds light on impact of loan complexity and misaligned underwriter incentives on lending outcomes
- Future work: even if machines can out-profit humans, *should* we switch to this kind of underwriting? What degree of managerial override is desirable?
  - ▶ Algorithmic lending can exacerbate racial disparities (Fuster, Goldsmith-Pinkham, Ramadorai, and Walther, 2021)
  - ▶ Impacts on competition? Financial stability?

Thanks!

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